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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD A. DYSON, STEPHEN F. 
KESLER, \~. T. BISSELL, RONALD 
HeCLA IN, DONALD L. OBORN, 
and ELMO WALKER, 
Plaintiffs (Donald A. 
Dyson, Appellant), 
vs. 
AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA, 
INCORPORATED, a Texas cor-
poration, and RANGER INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a New York 
corporation and KENNETH R. 
SHANNON, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA, 
INCORPORATED, a Texas cor-
poration, and RANGER INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a New York 
corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants/ 
Respondents, 
vs. 
DONALD A. DYSON, LeROY F. DYSON 
and L. F. DYSON & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Counterclaimants/Appellants. 
STEPHEN F. KESLER, W. T. 
BISSELL, RONALD McCLAIN, DONALD 
L. OBORN and ELMO WALKER, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
DONALD A. DYSON, LeROY DYSON 
and L. F. DYSON & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 15661 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
DONALD A. DYSON AND 
L. F. DYSON & ASSOCIATES, 
INC. 
FD 
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A U T H 0 R I T I E S 
I. Case law: 
Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty 
Underwriters, 487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971) 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, SOl P.2d 
266 (utah 1972) 
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 
221 (Utah 1958) 
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 
455 P. 2d 197 (Utah 1969) 
Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, 
239 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1969) . 
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 
325 P.2d 906 (Utah 1958) 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1977) 
II. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
Title 70A, U.C.C. 
Section 70A-l-103 
Section 70A-l-205(3) 
Section 70A-l-205(4) 
III. Utah Rules of Civil ProcedurE.:: 
Rule 73(d) 
Rule 73 ( 1) 
IV. Federal Rules of Civil Pruceclucc::: 
Rule 38 
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I. 
HlTRODUCTION 
Appellants Donald ~- Dyson and L. F. Dyson & Associates 
reply to the Briefs of Respondents ADA and Ranger Insurance 
cornpanj ancl Respondents l·:cslC'r, Hissell, 11cClain, Oborn, 1"/alker 
and Feruuson as 'ollo'->'S. 
II. 
REPLY TO .\OA AciD FANGER INSURAtJCE Cot1PANY 
A. The Shannon endorsement should be issued as a 
matter of la•v. 
Respondents' aryunent that no endorsement to add Shannon 
as a co'"erecJ pilot •nissc.~ the c-c•int of _.·,r-·rellants' appeal, i.e., 
~-)A to 
to rate the risk, it was obliged as 
.!ad all inforrT)d tion l1L'"-~'-·,.=,~<JL. tw rate the risk when it received 
che unquulificc' c<c·Utk'St t•) a•;,; ShaJcnon as a covered pilot. 
iJ,· ~"•''i''.'.:"_~t_!_ccc t!'"!e Shannon endorsement. 
1.t" ,. 1 ,,;t' t._· tilE· l·'•r3l effect of the record 
thv sz-t: t '1,-tt 1'1 :1~ l-1:-...t L1:,1•:.tl con:.n•lilllC:ltl~.._'n frorn the company 
:~ 0 11 C'' , l f', 1 l (' Lll!l'" sln~.._,e Hcsponcients' evidence 
3. s , lis(_· J :~ :::-,, ·:· l Ltntc;' Grief ,,•as insufficient 
(-' ,.., l tl )ll t i1tt .:Ju.__·]l ,_,onu:lunlcation was ever 
I 1 1• 'll' ,['.·' t_;l, : 1 r'-''' l t c' s t imony of Hrs. Cartwr igh· 
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was that it had never been received. The trial court acknowledged 
the deficiency in proof of mailing sufficient to raise a presump-
tion of receipt when it received AOA's file copy of the memo in 
evidence by stating, "I would say this, the acceptance of the exhi~: 
I would not interpret it as sayiJ1g, as proof you received it." 
(R. 632). 
C. The U.C.C. is not applicable to the transaction in 
question. 
An examination of Title 70A, Uniform Co1®1crcial Code, will 
reveal that it purports to deal with limited and specific types 
of transactions, e.g.: 
Chapter 2, Sales; 
Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; 
Chapter 4, Bank Deposits & Collections; 
Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; 
Chapter 6, Bulk Transfers; 
Chapter 7, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and 
Other Documents of Title; 
Chapter 8, Investment Securities; and 
Chapter 9, Secured Transactions. 
The section relied upon by Respondents, 70A-l-L0S(4), is contained 
within Chapter l, entitled General Provisions. To contend that sorr' 
language in the general provisions ot the cnrlc ,·lp[d ics to types of 
transactions not covered by the c•Jde is a s t rd i nP<l at trel'lpt at 
statutory construction not worthy o I' those Hhn urc1c it. Hoviever, 
even if one assumes that the qenc:ral p1·0visi"ns of thr' cor]f:' apply 
in this case, such provisions r;dkc' SIJtcifir· ,,,,(,_, tl1lt lhc 
-)-
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cf agent-principal law arc not to be abrog~ted by the code. A 
:;receding section of the code, §70/\-l-103 states: 
"Supplementary general principles of law applicable. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this 
act, the principles of law and equity, including the 
law merchant an0 the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other 
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement 
its provisions." 
Therefore, even if the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable 
to the present situation, it does not preclude appellants' conten-
tion that AOA's acknowledged policy of backdating endorsements to 
the date of request conferred upon appellants an apparent authority 
to bind the insurer. 
Subsection §70/\-l-205 I 3), which immediately precedes the 
subsection that respondents rely upon, states: 
"A course of dealinn between parties and any usage of 
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are 
engaged or of which they are or should be aware give 
particular meaninu to and supplement or qualify terms 
of an aoreement." 
It is clear that respondents' consisten~ and acknowledged 
practice of backdating the endorsements to the date of request was 
a "course of Llealinq betv1een the parties" v.'ith which respondents 
~·ere totally fafl'iliar. It is obvious from the literal words of the 
statute that this well-established course of dealing "supplement[s] 
or qual if~· l i,_,s] tcrn1s of 3ro aqrren1ent." 
'· State ~utofl'obile and Casualt~· Underwriters, 487 P.2d 
311 llL1h 19'1). 
Respondents fail 
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to point out that the Court in Barnett relied explicitly on the 
applicable provisions of the Utah Insurance Code which control all 
contracts for insurance in this state. In the present case, the 
issue involves an agency contract, not an insurance contract. 
Additionally, in the Barnett case, the Court specifically noted 
that the evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the custom 
asserted by the plaintiffs was disputed by the defendants. In the 
present case, there is no contention by the respondents that they 
did not have a practice of backdating endorsements to an existing 
policy. In fact, Mr. Tom Dougherty, a senior Vice-President at A~ 
specifically acknowledged that this was the practice of AOA (R. 6121 
E. Respondents'own actions have created an ambiguity. 
Respondents also set forth Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 
P.2d 221 (Utah 1958), a case of an action to recover rent, as the 
"rule for interpretation of contracts". (Respondents' Brief, p. 22 
In the Ephraim case, the Court found absolutely no ambiguity in the 
contract. However, in a later case, involving a dispute over the 
terms of an employment contract, the Court again addressed the isso 
of contract interpretation in the following language: 
"In Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., [26fi P.2d 494 (Utah 1954)] 
this court stated that in the int~rpret~tion of contracts, 
the interpretation given by the parties themselves as 
shown by their acts will be aclopterl by the court. (lie 
think this should be: will be regarded as advisory.) 
In Bullough v. Sims [400 P.2J 20 (Utah 1965)] this 
court explained that when parties place their own 
construction on their agreement and so perform, the 
court may consider this as persuasivEC e•;idcnce of what 
their true intention was. It is Lruc that the doctrine 
of practical construction may be appli<?d only when 
the contract is ambiguous; but thr· '!'Jest inn bc-contes 
ambiguous to whom? l'lhere the: pdrtic·s lta"e dcmonstr-atc,cJ 
by their actions a:HJ [-'er'nrl'Jarwe t!tdl to l!ll_-r'' the· 
contract meant somethincr quiLc ,1iflc r•;nt, the mcdttrnq 
and intent of the parti •;lrr,,rl•l ],,. --nfr,Jr·,-.1. In "'wt1 
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a situation, the parties by their actions have created 
the ambiguity to bring the rule into operation. If 
this were not the rule, the courts would be enforcing 
one contract when both parties have demonstrated that 
they meant and intended to the contract to be quite 
different." Bullfroa Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, SOl P.2d 
266 (Utah 1972). 
Respondents, by their own undisputed practice of backdating 
~dorsements, have clearly shown the meaning they themselves have 
placed upon the terms of the agency contract, or that they initially 
~reed to modify it by the course of their conduct. It is difficult 
~r appellants to understand how respondents, after engaging in this 
8ractice since October 1970 (R.507-Sll), which plainly demonstrates 
the meaning respondents placed on the tenDs of the agency contract, 
can now assert that they never intended to be bound by their own 
practices and policies. 
F. Respondents cannot dist1nguish away the case ~f 
Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Co., 239 A.2d 4 
(N.J. 1969). 
Through a careful, self-serving e~iting of the New Jersey 
SJpreme Court's opinion, respondents point out that in Travelers 
~e agent alleged that the company had expressly modified the agency 
, aareement, granting the aaent binding authority. Yet the Court 
specifically stated in its anecllysis of the facts that "[lv]e accept 
t~e premise that Travelers ne1·er 1n so many \vords authorized the 
acents to bind a risk in that c'atecJory." Id. at 6. Respondents 
Jlso atter;1pt t0 assert that the TLlvelers c'ourt implied that the 
J·Jthorization to the :tc'U1t \·"ls omlnauous ancl that this is not true 
ln the present case. (Rcspnndc'nts' Brief 25 and 26). However, as 
c'le:r:JC_avclers cusc clc:trh· points uut, the ambiguity was created by 
- ')-
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I' 
! 
the company's repeated policy of backdating policies, not by the 
terms of the written agreement. Those circumstances in Travelers 
which led the court to its conclusion that the agent had apparent 
authority to bind the company parallel the circumstances found in 
the present situation, i.e., a clear practice of backdating endorse-
ments grants the agent the authority to bind the company on endorse-
ments to existing policies, a fact admitted by Mr. Dougherty. 
Also, respondents assert that the holdino of the Travelers 
case was based on a theory of modification which ca:,not apply to 
this case. Yet, respondents ignore the clearly stated holding 
of Travelers court: 
"We prefer to hold that a practice of backdatin•r policies 
to the date requested in the application implies, as 
between principal and agent, authority in the agent 
to bind a risk pendinq the principal's decision on the 
application." Id. at 9. 
The practice of backdating policies was without doubt the basis 
for the holding in Travelers. That exact practice is unarguably the 
practice on which appellants relied in the present case. That 
practice was instituted by the respondents and was in effect since 
October, 1970. To allow the respondents to now disavow this practice 
would clearly lead to an unfair ancl inequitable: rcs11lt. 
G. Respondents' argument_':l!lc~e_r _I'r~~:l_T_'/ ~~--ci_"l1oot_s_1_:c.CC!E" 
argument that beqs _ _:t:_h_c_i~s_c_~~ __ l_[1.'1_U('~':'llon. 
Respondents state that "the tr1al court t.cld that: l\01\ an<i 
Ranger had not accepted the ri,;k on Shannron ,1s cJ pi l<Jt :-;ince no 
endorsement was specifically macle nor Wil'; ,, cou rs•· <J f conduct 
shown to impliedly cover Shannon", c,v,•r](}nk1n:J tlt<c 1-,l,_ that 
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:lr. Dougherty admitted the practici'O in question. Interestingly, 
respondents do not attempt to Justify the reasons given by AOA's 
claims department for denying coverage of the loss. The issue is 
~t whether Shannon had been endorsed on the policy, but whether 
0 r not under the acknowledged "backdating" practice, ne should have 
been end or sed. The claims department was silent on the issue. 
Likewise, the other reason given, that Dyson was not the sole 
~ner of the aircraft is without merit, since the application for the 
insurance does not even request such information, and in any event, 
~son still had a security interest ln tne aircrafL at the time 
of the loss. AOA/Ranger's stated reasons for denial of coverage 
are nothing more than a bad faith attempt to deny coverage under a 
fact situation where they would have "backdated" the requested 
endorsement and charged a premium therefor if the loss had not 
occurred before they had processed the requested endorsement. 
III. 
REPLY TO RFSPO~DENTS KESLER, E~ AL. 
A. Appellants' appeal of the judgment in favor of 
respondents Kesler, et al., was not for the purpose 
of delay. 
Utah Rule of Civil Pr0cedure 73(1) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"on the> trial of the c-ause on apl)eal, if it appears 
to the court that the appeal was made solely for 
delay, 1 t rno:· a,l,! to the c·.·st s such clamageas may 
be just, not exccectino twenty-five percent of 
the J u,1qp1cnt atc:occll ·"l 'r<)n:." (Emphasis adcled). 
i\t the tr1ol, til'-' pal·tics entered into a stipulation in 
·,:~lch the o:•son ,·,,JCelk·:· dc!mittc•,[ lia!Jili.ty to saicl plaintiffs (Kesler, 
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et al.) "if no insurance coverage was found to exist". Trial 
court's Memorandum Decision, p. 4 (emphasis added). The trial 
court found that no insurance coverage did exist and that, therefore, 
the Dyson Agency breached its contract with the plaintiffs Kesler, 
et al. The Dyson Agency has appealed that decision to this Court. 
If this Court finds that AOA should have issued an endorsement coven:.: 
Shannon or a pilot as requested, and, therefore, that insurance 
coverage did indeed exist in law, then Dyson would not have brea~~ 
his contract with the plaintiffs Kesler, et al., and the trial 
court's ruling that the Dyson Agency breached its contract with the 
plaintiffs Kesler, et al. would be erroneous and there would be no 
grounds for liability of the Dyson defendants to the plaintiffs. 
It is clear from these facts that Dysons' appeal from the 
judgment against them in favor of the plaintiffs is not "made solely 
for delay" but rather, to the contrary, because there are genuine 
issues of law concerning the liability between Dysons and the 
plaintiffs to be resolved by this Court. Furthermore, the Dyson 
Agency, in compliance with Rule 73 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
has filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $30,000.00, which 
further evidences Dysons' intent to meet any final judgment render~ 
against them. 
The appellants Kesler, et al. assert that Rule 7'3 (l) is simik 
I 
to Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedur~ and cite several I 
Federal cases which applied this rule. Federal Rule 38 states: 
"If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal 
is frivolous, it may award just clamaqes anc1 sinqle 
or double costs to the appellee." 
Even a cursory reading of the t'.·lo rules rc·veals a siqnificant 
-8-
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difference. Unlike the Federal Rule, the Utah Rule allows damages 
only if the appeal was made for the sole purpose of delay while the 
broader Federal Rule extends to all frivolous appeals. The issues 
raised on appeal by the appellants clearly show tbat the appeal 
was not taken solely for delay, but because appellants contend that 
the trial court erred and that insurance coverage did exist as a 
matter of law for the loss in question and, therefore, appellants 
should not be held liable to the Kesler, et al. respondents. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the plaintiffs Kesler, 
et al. have cross-appealed the decision of the trial court. By 
asking for additional damages from this court they are in effect 
requesting this court to have the Dyson Agency pay for their own 
independent appeal. 
B. The trial court did not err in denying plaincrff 
respondents' attorneys fees in this action. 
It is well settled in Utah that a party cannot recover 
attorney's fees from an opposing party without an express contractual 
or statutory duty for the opposing party to pay such fees. Stubbs 
v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) Plaintiffs Kesler, et al. 
relies on Pacific Coast 'T'itle Co. v. Hartford, 325 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1958) to support their claim for attorney's fees. The issue in that 
case was whether a party was entitled to recover attorney's fees 
from an opposing party in an action aqainst a third party brought 
about as a direct result of the oprosing party's breach. In that 
case, the plaintiff, a title insurance company, issued title insurance 
Policy for hor1es beinq built b\' a contractor. Due to the financing 
reguirefllents, these polici<.'s \,·ere issued before the rights of 
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materialmen and laborers had been concluded. For that very 
reason, the title company was the named obligee on a bond issued by 
the defendants which stated that the title company would be saved 
harmless from defaults on the part of the contractor. The con tractor 
failed to meet its obligations to its subcontractors and materialmen 
who filed liens and subsequently attempted to foreclose the liens. 
The title company, due to its obligation to keep the titles unen-
cumbered, had an obligation to defend against these liens. 
The court found that this series of events could reasonably 
be foreseen and that the defendant's bond was issued specifically to 
protect the title company from that type of loss. In the present 
case, the trial court specifically found that the plaintiff's 
attorney's fees were fees claimed within the plaintiff's action 
itself. (Memorandum Decision, 19). 
The plaintiffs claim that they were "forced to participate in 
the lawsuit because of their being moving parties in initiating the 
action and because they could not be released from attendance at 
the trial" (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 9). However, plaintiffs fail to 
point out that Dyson hi~self was a party to the orioinal suit filed 
against AOA and that after the plaintiffs filed suit aoainst Dyson 
personally and the Dyson .'lc:ency, thee· inde:Jendentl~· electec to con-
tinue their o\,'Tl clail" aoainst .;oo,. 1~\e:'lorandumf\pirlion, ;:o. 19). 
The plaintiffs ~ade this election 'lespite the s'=l:J\llcttion aG:ceed to 
by Dyson that admitted liability to th~ "laint1~;s i: no ins~rance 
coverage was found to exist. 
-I '-
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::.dr cLum against D·;son, slnce no matter v;hat occurred in the 
SJlt between Dj'son and J,OA/P.anger, the rlaintiffs would recover 
:Jnages for the loss of the aircraft, either from Dyson or from 
:an'jer. 
c. The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs 
interest incurred on their Walker Bank note. 
There is no better settled rule of law than that the measure 
,. damages for a breach of contract is that v:hich puts the non-
:reaching rarty in as good pos1tion as he would have been had there 
;;oen no breach. Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 
:?69). Even accertino, arguendo, the trial court's decision that 
:1·son did breach the contract h'ith the plaintiffs, there is no 
~;bt that the plaintiffs would have had to ray the interest on 
:~note to Kalker Bank & Trust Conpany . The plaintiffs were obligors 
. :.C:er this note and the lnsurance CO'.'erage \vhich they sought through 
::,c D:;son Aoency h·as <"or the •:alue of the aircraft, not for the 
·o.Le of their debt obligations. 
PlaintiFfs' araument that since Dyson was a joint obligor 
.:.C:er the note he, in effect, has agreed to pay the higher rate of 
::Jterest is totall"' S[)Urious anc fri'.'Olous. This argument conveni-
o:J:l"· overlooks the ob\·ious fact that on the original note the 
=~ai:.':l:'fs ··:ere also cJblu:ors ,_,ho ha:1 aareecl to pay their share of 
-~.>2 :~.:.e~cst. 
~~~e~t that o~--:c ~ ... r.n Sl,;rts :1 ;1.1:"to ~lS '-J. lOl:Jt obli~.._-:or aarees to pay 
an~ ~~at the other JOint obligors 
~3 none. 
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This court has specifically stated that when a party breaches 
a contract to repay a sum certain, "the measure of the damages for 
such a breach would ordinarily have been the legal rate of interest 
allowable for such non-performance". Reed v. Armstrong, 6 Utah 
2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 (1957). To hold that Dyson is liable for 
interest damages beyond that amount would clearly be an award of 
punitive damages against Dyson for breach of contract. 
IV. 
SUMMARY 
For the reasons set forth in appellants' Brief, the judgment 
of the trial court in favor of AOA/Ranger should be reversed since 
the trial court erred in not applying the legal principals set 
forth in Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, 239 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1968) 
to the facts of this case and AOA's reasons for denial of coverage 
amount to nothing more than a bad faith attempt to avoid coverage 
under an endorsement AOA should have issued, and eventually would 
have issued, had not the loss occurred before processing had been 
completed. 
The trial court's judgment denying the Walker Bank interest 
as an item of damages should be affirmed since the purchasers of 
the aircraft (plaintiffs/respondents) would have had to pay the 
Walker Bank interest, even if there had been no loss, and, thus, 
no question regarding insurance coverage ever raised. 
Likewise, the trial court's denial of attorney's fees as an 
item of damages was proper since there was no agreement between 
the parties regarding the payment of fees necessary to suoport such 
an award. 
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Appellants did not undertake this appeal for the purposes 
of delay, but for the bona fide purpose of contesting the trial 
oourt's judgment in favor of AOA/Ranqer, which appellants verily 
~lieve to be erroneous, and, therefore, no penalty under 
?ule 73(1), U.R.C.P., should be assessed against appellants, even 
:f this Court were to sustain the judgment in favor of AOA/Ranger, 
·,·,·hich appellants pray should be reversed. 
\\THEREFORE, appellants pray that this Honorable Court reverse 
:he judgment of the trial court by directing that judgment be entered 
:n favor of Donald A. Dyson against AOA/Ranqer on plaintiffs' 
:omplaint, or that judgment be entered in favor of Donald A. Dyson 
lnd L. F. Dyson & Associates on their Counterclaim against AOA/ 
?.anger in the amount of any judgment found in favor of the Owners 
ogainst the Dy sons. 
Alternatively, appellants pray that the action be remanded 
to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
~r trial by jury pursuant to appellants' demand therefor prior 
:o the trial of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1979. 
H. \'.'AYNE I·:ADSI'iORTH 
of and for 
•·:T'.TKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants Donald 
A. Dyson and L. F. Dyson & 
."\ssociates, Inc. 
--- ------~~~~~ 
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I'IALLACE R. LAUGHNOR 
of and for 
MOFFAT, WELLING & PAULSEN 
900 Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant Donald 
A. Dyson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to each counsel for the 
parties as designated below on the 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
WALKER & HINTZE 
4685 Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
day of January, 1979. 
Attorneys for Respondents Stephen 
F. Kesler, W. T. Bissell, Ronald 
McClain, Donald L. Oborn and Elmo Walker 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
REYNOLDS & ARNOLD 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent Gary Ferguson 
STUART L. POELMAN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & HARTINEAU 
200 South Main, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents Aviation 
Office of America, Inc. and Ranger 
Insurance Company 
-----------------H. \vAYNr: HADS\'/ORTH 
Of Appellants' Attorneys 
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